












Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine
Printed version
Date of publication: 20 March 2019




Wei Cui, Jie Cheng and Dominika Wiesner, « Judicial Review of Government Actions in China  », China
Perspectives [Online], 2019-1 | 2019, Online since 19 March 2020, connection on 19 December 2020.
URL : http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/8703  ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/
chinaperspectives.8703 
© All rights reserved
Introduction 
China’s laws and policies on the judicial review of government actionsare often presented as an important bellwether of the government’sattitude towards the rule of law. (1) Accordingly, in the last few years,
in gauging the direction of legal reform in the Xi Jinping era, media reports
have highlighted changes in litigation against government agencies as evi-
dence of positive movement towards the greater rule of law, albeit only
contradicted by other evidence of political repression and increasing au-
thoritarianism. (2) Regardless of whether the institution of judicial review
can bear the symbolic weight that has thus been vested in it – we believe
there are many reasons to be sceptical (Cui 2017) – the last few years have
indeed witnessed very momentous changes in China’s administrative liti-
gation system. In 2014, the Administrative Litigation Law (ALL) received its
first amendment since its original adoption in 1989; the newly (and exten-
sively) amended statute took effect on 1st May 2015. (3) In 2018, China’s
Supreme People’s Court (SPC) published a lengthy Interpretation on the Ap-
plication of the Administrative Litigation Law (hereinafter the “2018 SPC
Interpretation”), which replaced and substantially revised previous interpre-
tations and ushered in a number of important doctrinal and institutional
innovations. More generally, reforms carried out since 2014 of the Chinese
judicial system – including especially the centralisation (to the provincial
level) of court financing, re-allocation of jurisdiction to higher courts, the
creation of new supra-provincial circuit courts, and dramatic changes to
judges’ career incentives – all have had direct impact on the administrative
tribunals that hear lawsuits against government agencies. 
The empirical reality of judicial review makes these statutory, doctrinal,
and institutional changes even harder to ignore. The number of first-instance
lawsuits against government agencies in China surged from 123,194 in 2013
to 230,432 in 2017, an increase of 87%; and the number of second-instance
disputes (i.e., appeals) from such lawsuits increased even faster – 207%, or
from 35,222 to 108,099. (4) On a per capita basis, the volume of adminis-
trative litigation in China already surpasses that of Taiwan, (5) and no doubt
of some other countries where both democratic accountability and judicial
independence are regarded as well established.  
In this essay, we provide a selective review of these recent changes in the
doctrines and procedures of judicial review. Our review adopts a pragmatic
and comparative approach. In our view, the question of whether lawsuits
might be brought against the government has arguably become less inter-
esting than the question of how courts will decide such lawsuits. And the
generic notion of judicial independence itself no longer sheds sufficient light
on the range of actual and possible judicial responses. However, many media
and scholarly commentaries (both Chinese and Western) on judicial review
in China remain fixated on symbolic values. Arguably, this fixation has given
rise to institutional arrangements that threaten to diminish, rather than en-
hance, judicial authority. 
As a particular example, we examine controversies surrounding the scope
of review under the ALL in sections entitled “A comparative perspective on
the scope of review” and “Innovations in the 2018 SPC interpretation”
below. Conventional wisdom has it that the scope of judicial review in China
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1. The Chinese-language literature on administrative litigation in China is too voluminous to cite
here. We cite specific relevant sources below. For some recent scholarly contributions in English
we refer to He (2018); Liebman et al. (2017); Cui and Wang (2017).
2. E.g., Ian Johnson, “China Grants Courts Greater Autonomy on Limited Matters,” The New York
Times, 2 January 2016, https://nyti.ms/1YXhQ7F (accessed on 1 September 2018); “Justice served,
sometimes: For some plaintiffs, courts in China are getting better,” The Economist, 30 September
2017, 424(9060): 57. 
3. Hereinafter we refer to the amended Administrative Litigation Law as the 2015 ALL, and to the
statute before its 2014 amendment as the 1989 ALL. 
4. All statistics cited in this essay for 2013-2016 are from the China Law Yearbook. 2017 litigation
statistics are based on unpublished data provided to the authors by the SPC. 
5. For case volume in the Taiwanese administrative court system in recent years, see statistics from
the Judicial Yuan of the Republic of China (Taiwan), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/report/sg-
2.htm (first instance) and http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/report/sc-2.htm (appeals) (accessed
on 1 September 2018).
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is too narrow. We show that from a comparative administrative law per-
spective, the scope of review under pre-2015 practice was in fact quite nor-
mal. Rather, it is the effort to extend such scope since 2015 that is unusual
by international standards. At the same time, we show that an issue that
has been central to the practice of administrative law in liberal democ-
racies – namely the standard of review that courts adopt when examin-
ing the justifiability of government actions – has often been ignored both
in institutional reform in China and in scholarly commentaries. Register-
ing this issue indeed allows us to identify an important rolling back of
judicial authority implied by recent reforms. This development raises the
possibility that symbolism-motivated advocacy to improve administra-
tive litigation in China may come at the expense of protecting the non-
symbolic functions of judicial review, and of guaranteeing what judges
really care about, i.e., the coherence of law and consistency in the deliv-
ery of justice. 
Before delving into this particular controversy, we provide background in-
formation regarding the ALL amendment (and its subsequent SPC elabora-
tion) and the impact of judicial reform on administrative litigation in Section
I. The conclusion offers some reflections on the ALL’s evolution. 
The 2015 ALL and post-2013 judicial reform 
Background 
The revision of the 1989 ALL had been the subject of a decade-long dis-
cussion sustained by top-down reform proposals from the Standing Com-
mittee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) as well as the SPC. In
December 2003, the 10th NPCSC listed the revision of the ALL as a Cate-
gory II item in its legislative plan – meaning that the NPCSC would work
on a draft without deliberating on it immediately. It was not until Decem-
ber 2013 that the legislative plan of the 12th NPCSC made ALL revision
into a Category I item, to be deliberated in the current term. Systematic
research on the ALL’s revision followed these two inclusions in the NPCSC
legislative agenda, especially between 2005-2007 and then 2012-2014
(Zhang 2015: 66). (6)
The SPC played an important role in this process. A book for which senior
SPC judge Jiang Bixin 江必新 served as chief editor and co-author, Perfection
of China’s Administrative Litigation System: A Practical Study for an ALL Re-
vision, became a classic (Jiang 2005), and helped to frame many of the
major issues in the debate in this area. (7) The view expressed in his book
was as much institutional as it was personal. (8) Jiang identified four major
issues as critical to reforming administrative litigation: (1) empowering the
administrative tribunal, (2) nurturing a profession of administrative law
judges, (3) achieving efficiency and inclusiveness of adjudication, and (4)
enhancing jurisdictional flexibility (Jiang 2005: 9-12). The SPC’s influence
on the ALL revision is visible through both the issues emphasised by the
NPCSC during its deliberations and the structure of the revisions to the law.
For example, when Xin Chunying 信春鹰, vice director of the NPCSC Leg-
islative Affairs Office, introduced the Draft Revision of the ALL on the last
day of 2013, she mentioned the “three difficulties of adjudication” (i.e., of
filing a case, of adjudicating a case, and of enforcing a decision rendered),
which echoed the “three difficulties” originally formulated by Jiang in 2005
(Jiang 2005: 9-10). Many provisions of the Draft Revision were also antici-
pated in the 11 topics that structured Jiang’s book. Nonetheless, among the
four critical issues identified by Jiang (and his SPC colleagues), the NPCSC
prioritised issues of adjudication (including the so-called three difficulties),
and hesitated to proceed with the first two structural issues (i.e. the roles
of administrative tribunals and of judges). 
Scholars and other actors expressed somewhat different ideas about the
ALL revision. According to a survey conducted after the release of the Draft
Revised ALL, topics most frequently mentioned as being of interest included:
(1) the scope of review, i.e., typology of cases and disputes reviewable; (2)
the distribution of cases among different levels of courts; (3) the codifica-
tion of the role of mediation in the litigation process; (4) public interest lit-
igation, and (5) the review of informal policy documents (IPDs, guifanxing
wenjian 规范性文件) (Li 2016: 114). (9) While almost all of these topics can
be found in Jiang’s 2005 book or in the articles or books of other SPC judges
(Li, Wang and Liang 2013: 69), (10) they lacked the structural and institutional
focus that characterised the SPC reformers’ proposals. Thus, public com-
mentaries are of interest mainly because they highlighted the exceedingly
conservative approach of the 2013 NPCSC Draft, which for the most part
merely compiled existing judicial interpretations (Li 2016: 111). In any case,
discussions regarding structural court reform were largely limited to the ad-
ministrative law community. 
Entering 2014, political initiatives of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
accelerated the process of ALL reform. First, the CCP adopted the “Decision
on Several Important Issues for Full-fledged Deepening Reform” in
November 2013. Then the Leading Group on Comprehensively Deepening
Reform (LGCDR) was established, headed by Xi Jinping. On February 28,
2014, the LGCDR issued the Opinions and Division of Labour to Enforce
Deepening Judicial and Social Reform. This document laid the foundation
for the system for limiting the proportion of judges in court staffing
(faguan yuan’e zhi 法官员额制), as well as for creating cross-region/district
courts. (11) In October 2014, the CCP passed the Decision on Facilitating
Fully-Fledged Rule of Law, which, among other things, urged reforming
the docketing system from implementing substantive review to a mere
registration system. 
In response to these new policies as well as public criticism, the NPCSC
published an updated Revised Draft in 2014, amending 61 of the 75 articles
of the 1995 ALL. In addition to the original proposal, the draft highlighted
the following arrangements: (1) the case registration system, (2) the re-
sponsibility of agency leaders to attend court hearings, (3) making admin-
istrative reconsideration bodies defendants, (4) sanctioning improper
administrative acts, and (5) judicial review of IPDs. Among these, only the
proposal for the case registration system had been anticipated by the 2013
Draft; other new proposals could all be seen as responding to the CCP’s ju-
dicial reform policy. This draft was deliberated by the NPCSC and passed
with minor changes on 1 November 2014 (Qiao 2014).
36 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 9 / 1
6. Before 2003, research on and criticism of the 1989 ALL were sporadic.
7. Jiang participated in drafting the 1989 ALL and was the director of the SPC’s Administrative Di-
vision between 1999-2002, becoming a SPC Vice President by 2003. He was appointed Vice Di-
rector of the Constitutional and Legal Committee of the NPC in March 2018, right after the 2018
Judicial Interpretation was published. 
8. The book was co-authored with other SPC judges, including Cai Xiaoxue, Gan Wen, Duan Xiaojing,
and Liang Fengyun.
9. See the section entitled “A comparative perspective on the scope of review” below for an extended
discussion of pre-2015 practice in the review of IPDs.
10. ALL experts also held rather philosophical debates about whether a through re-write or an incre-
mental revision was appropriate, and whether an independent administrative court system should
be put in place.
11. The SPC promptly echoed this policy with its fourth Five-year Reform Plan in July 2014, empha-
sising the judges’ quota system, case registration, and cross-region court experiments.
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An overview of the 2015 ALL 
The 2015 ALL kept the original structure of the 1989 ALL, but was elabo-
rated and enriched to contain 103 articles. Some major revisions are sum-
marised below (Tong 2015: 22-7). 
Incremental expansion of the scope of review 
Under the 2015 ALL, individuals, organisations, or legal persons may file a
lawsuit if they believe that an “administrative action” violates their legal
rights and interests (Article 2). The term “administrative action” replaced
the term “concrete administrative action” in the 1989 ALL, although this
drafting change has little significance in itself in expanding the scope of re-
view. This is basically because the 2015 ALL retains a provision (Article 13)
from the 1989 ALL that excludes four categories of government actions
from judicial review – including formal and informal rulemaking. More sub-
stantively, Article 2(2) extends the definition of “administrative action” to
include decisions made by organisations authorised to exercise administra-
tive mandates, such as universities and some regulatory bodies. In addition,
Article 12 details 11 areas in which legal proceedings may be launched
against governments, making explicit reference to violations of agreements
on land and housing compensation, unlawful alteration or rescission of
agreements on commercial operations franchised by the government, and
illegal restriction of an individual’s physical freedom. While all government
actions encroaching on the personal and property rights of plaintiffs can be
challenged (before and after 2015), the new statutory enumeration seemed
to identify areas where the need to cope with social resentment and unrest
is most urgent. 
The SPC further elaborated the scope of judicial review in the 2018 SPC
Interpretation. The Interpretation sets out another ten categories of exclu-
sions from review, all of which had been grey areas in which judges made
inconsistent decisions: (i) public or national security investigations pursuant
to the criminal procedure law; (ii) mediation and arbitration as provided by
law; (iii) administrative guidance; (iv) reaffirmations of previous decisions;
(v) administrative actions without external effect; (vi) preparatory and de-
liberative acts; (vii) enforcement of court decisions; (viii) internal supervisory
acts; (ix) decisions against petitions; and (x) administrative acts that have
no actual effect on individuals and legal persons. Together with the 2015
ALL, the 2018 SPC Interpretation now provides clearer statements about
the scope of reviewable issues. 
Terminologically, one might say that these are all issues relating to causes
of action. Discussions of the “scope of review” debate in China also some-
times touch on what issues courts are allowed to render decisions on. We
discuss courts’ new ability to review IPDs in the next section (“A compara-
tive perspective on the scope of review”). 
Clarification on standing
The 1989 ALL’s standard for standing was formulated subjectively – one
may bring a suit if one “considers” that a concrete administrative action in-
fringes on one’s lawful rights and interests (Article 2). A 2000 SPC’s Inter-
pretation of the 1989 ALL stipulated that only those who possess legal rights
and interests may bring a case – which was characterised by some as overly
narrow (Jiang 2013: 9). The 2015 ALL aimed to resolve this controversy. It
provides that a person subjected to an administrative action or any other
person with an interest in the administrative action has the right to file a
complaint (Article 25). The phrase “with an interest” is considered to be
broader than “with legal rights and interests,” but narrower than “who con-
siders his interest [violated]” (Tong 2015: 25). 
The 2018 SPC interpretation provides further rules to identify eligible plain-
tiffs under Article 25 of the 2015 ALL. Parties newly specified as eligible in-
clude, for example, (i) persons who file a complaint to an agency to maintain
their lawful rights and interests and who wish to dispute the processing
agency’s response (Article 12(5)); (ii) a creditor where an agency action to-
wards a debtor damages the creditor’s claim, and where the agency is legally
required to provide protection or give consideration to the creditor’s rights
(Article 13); (iii) the founder or capital contributor to a non-profit entity that
deems an agency action to infringe upon the lawful rights and interests of
the entity (in which case the founder or contributor may file a complaint in
its own name) (Article 17); and (iv) an owners’ committee of jointly owned
property, or a qualified owner (or owners) of such property (Article 18).
However, the revised ALL refrains from giving non-government parties the
right to commence public interest litigation. During the debate on the ALL
revision, both civil society and public prosecutors were considered potential
plaintiffs for public interest litigation (Jiang 2013: 16). Before 2015, courts
also accepted cases brought by non-governmental organisations. (12) Indeed,
in 2014, the Environment Protection Law was revised and Article 58 pro-
vides that registered social organisations may bring public interest litigation.
However, in a 2017 amendment of the ALL, the NPCSC added paragraph 4
to ALL Article 25, providing that the procuratorate may bring a suit when
responsible administrative agencies engage in conduct (or fail to take ac-
tion) in violation of the law, in areas of environmental protection, food and
drug security, state assets protection, and state land use right transactions,
or where national or public interest may be harmed. The 2017 ALL revision
therefore excludes civil society from public interest administrative litigation,
although public interest litigation through civil proceedings is still possible.  
Improving adjudication
The 2015 ALL codifies the case registration system that began to be im-
plemented in May 2015 for both civil and administrative cases, which made
courts more accessible for potential plaintiffs. Previously, courts would ac-
cept cases only after a substantive review of the filed documents. Many
cases were screened out with no reasons given, and sometimes for being
too “sensitive” or “complicated.” (13) The new case registration system re-
quires that all complaints be registered and filed automatically with only
minimal review. If a court declines to take a case, it must issue a reason for
the rejection, and the decision can be challenged. 
The revised ALL also reforms the allocation of jurisdiction, allowing inter-
mediate courts to adjudicate disputes involving government agencies above
the county level (Article 15). Article 18 further authorises the SPC and high
courts to designate certain courts to adjudicate disputes across jurisdictions.
While the statute contemplates no move to independent administrative
courts, the door is not completely closed: both the Beijing Fourth Interme-
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12. For example, there was a 2009 case brought by All-China Environment Federation against Guizhou
Qingzhen City Land Resource Bureau (Jin 2014: 70).
13. In a survey conducted in 2013, 19.4% of participant judges admitted that they have rejected
cases that should have been accepted (Lin and Song 2013). Note that media reports, such as that
in The New York Times (Johnson supra note 2) – claiming that “by the mid-2000s, about 60 per-
cent of these cases were rejected outright by courts, according to government statistics” – often
fail to provide the source of cited statistics. 
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diate Court and the Shanghai Third Intermediate Court were created in
2015, based on the original railroad court model, (14) and mainly deal with
administrative cases in Beijing and Shanghai, respectively. 
The 2015 ALL also adds mediation as a type of remedy. A traditional the-
ory had it that government agencies were to enforce the law and should
be prohibited from bargaining with individuals. That theory, however, has
become anachronistic with government powers extending to many eco-
nomic areas. Contemporary studies provide evidence that mediation miti-
gates conflicts and reduces administrative costs. (15) The 2015 revision
reflects this new understanding of the functions of mediation in public law.
Court leverage on agency defendants 
The revised ALL requires that the person in charge of the defendant agency
appear in court or designate staff members to do so (Article 3). If the agency
refuses to perform acts required by a judgment, the person in charge may
be detained; and if the circumstances of such refusal are serious and con-
stitute a crime, criminal liability will be imposed on the person in charge
(Article 59). Moreover, the revised ALL provides that the court may fine the
responsible government official 50-100 RMB each day if he or she fails to
comply with the court decision (Article 96(2)) and may also publicise the
non-compliance of the government agency (Article 96(3)). These unique
provisions clearly aim to deter government misconduct through social and
psychological pressures. 
Reform of the judiciary in general
As already discussed, the revision of the ALL benefited from the CCP’s gen-
eral judicial reform effort after 2013, especially with respect to case regis-
tration and new arrangements for jurisdictional assignment. Indeed, the
revision of the ALL must be considered part of China’s general judicial re-
form. Before 2013, the SPC’s various reform plans had stalled due to reform
measures being perceived as too aggressive or even as possibly eroding CCP
authority. For example, the second Five-year Plan (2004-2008) expressly
promoted judicial independence and judicial authority. Yet it was precisely
during this period that the SPC had to repeal its 2001 judicial interpretation
on the Qi Yuling case (a landmark case displaying judicial activism in con-
stitutional interpretation). By 2013, the Party’s Propaganda Department
had even explicitly designated “judicial independence” as a politically in-
correct term. (16) Moreover, systematic institutional changes, especially in
terms of court organisation, personnel reform and financial security, re-
quired political support from the NPC (for parliamentary authorisation of
fundamental organisational changes), the State Council (for court finance),
as well as from the Party. Without broad political support, previous judicial
reforms invariably ended up focusing narrowly on improvements of profes-
sionalism and procedure. (17)
In contrast, the SPC released its Fourth Judicial Reform Plan (2014-2018)
after the CCP issued its own rule of law policy (in October 2014): the new
plan functioned as a detailed implementation strategy for the Party’s new
policy, and can claim to directly reflect the Party’s preferences. As a result,
this new round of judicial reform was able to achieve crucial goals that
eluded previous reformers. 
Some aspects of structural judicial reform specifically addressed admin-
istrative litigation. These include (1) creating circuit courts of the SPC to
adjudicate important, cross-jurisdictional cases (both civil and administra-
tive); (2) creating lower-level, cross-region courts to adjudicate environ-
mental law, bankruptcy, important administrative and other types of cases
that might encounter local interference; and (3) encouraging intermediate
courts to take on first-instance administrative cases and allowing basic level
courts to swap jurisdictions on administrative cases. (18) All three measures
aim to prevent local interference and enable relatively independent and
neutral adjudication. (19)
Other aspects of judicial reform are also relevant for administrative liti-
gation. These include, for example, promoting judicial transparency by in-
troducing open trial and the online publication of court decisions (Liebman
et al. 2017). They also include screening out over 60% of court employees
that previously had the title of judges, many of whom were under-
qualified. (20) The process of reappointing judges as qualified judges was still
ongoing in 2018.
It is worth pointing out that some of the reform measures – especially
the case registration system and scheme to disqualify 60% of all judges –
went against the preference of the judiciary, and were promoted as a part
of the CCP’s political agenda. Whether this will produce some kind of strate-
gic backlash from the courts is yet to be seen. Also, although “de-localisa-
tion” is a clear goal of the reform, it is not clear if the central government
will provide necessary financial support to lower-level courts. Moreover,
even the new cross-region courts (funded by the Central government) are
still expected to adopt the existing bureaucratic structure, where the court
president can intervene in all cases adjudicated and thus threaten indepen-
dent adjudication.
A comparative perspective on the scope of
review 
Having provided an overview of the ALL’s recent amendments and the as-
pects of judicial reform that bear on administrative litigation, we now turn
to an issue that exemplifies divergent ideological approaches to enhancing
judicial review in China. 
Under pre-2015 law and practice, Chinese courts’ power to review regu-
lations and other policy directives adopted by executive branch agencies
took three main forms. First, if a regulation (guizhang 规章) was offered as
the legal basis of agency action, a court must determine whether the reg-
ulation was legal and in force before giving it application as law. (21) Second,
if some “other normative document” (qita guifanxing wenjian 其他规范性
文件, which we refer to as informal policy document or IPD here) was of-
fered as the legal basis of an agency action, such document had no binding
force on courts. Courts could nevertheless give it effect after reviewing and
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14. Railroad courts used to be affiliated with Ministry of Railroad and had cross-region jurisdictions.
15. Hu and Tang present seven local courts that experimented with administrative mediation starting
from 2006 (Hu and Tang 2011: 5, see especially footnote 4). 
16. Circular on the Current Ideological Field, in Mirror, August 2013 (43), Hong Kong. The circular was
famous for listing seven prohibited terms, or “seven no’s” in China. 
17. Indeed, as a backlash to the Second Five-year Reform, the SPC’s Third Five-year Reform empha-
sised popular responsibility.
18. See, 2013 SPC Notice on Carrying Out the Pilot Work of Centralising Jurisdiction in Administrative
Cases; 2014 SPC Guiding Opinion on Centralised Adjudication of Administrative Cases on a Cross-
Administrative-Region Basis.
19. Since 2015, the SPC has created six circuit courts, as well as two cross-district courts in Beijing
and Shanghai.
20. Only 39% of the judges under the previous status quo will be able to keep their titles as judges
(Gao 2015). 
21. 1989 ALL Article 53, par. 1; Shanghai Meeting Minutes, Section 1, par. 1.  
Special feature
confirming its legality, validity, reasonableness, and appropriateness. (22) That
is, legality was not sufficient for an IPD to be given effect: a court had dis-
cretion to disregard IPDs based on judgments about their reasonableness
and appropriateness – or it could even simply disregard them altogether,
without review. Third and finally, there was a set of circumstances in which
a court might suspend judicial proceedings and seek resolution of conflicts
among formally binding legal rules, through interlocutory procedures that
transmited questions to the executive branch. One such circumstance was
irresolvable conflicts among ministerial and subnational regulations, (23) but
the interlocutory procedure was also available for a wider range of conflicts
among other types of formally binding law. (24)
It has long been conventional wisdom among commentators on Chinese
administrative law that these parameters for judicial review were too re-
strictive (He 2018; Tong 2015). The restrictions most frequently criticised
were two. First, Article 12(2) of the 1989 ALL explicitly ruled out lawsuits
brought merely to challenge “administrative statutes and regulations, or
decisions and orders with general binding force formulated and announced
by administrative entities.” That is, agency adoption of formal or informal
rules – colloquially labelled “abstract administrative actions” – could be
causes of action, even if the rules adopted were suspected to be illegal, un-
reasonable, or otherwise flawed. (25) As discussed, this provision remains un-
changed in the 2015 ALL, despite the fact that the 2014 amendment no
longer refers to “specific administrative actions” in its provisions on permis-
sible causes of action.  
Second, Chinese courts could not invalidate or “strike down” agency rules
(formal or informal) in the sense of precluding them from future enforce-
ment. Instead, they only had the choice (for the most part) of not applying
an invalid or otherwise unacceptable rule in a given case. This remains the
case under the 2015 ALL, although, as discussed below, the SPC has adopted
some extraordinary measures to put the executive on notice of the need
to change invalid IPDs. 
Conventional wisdom has it that these two restrictions rendered the law
of administrative litigation in China defective; such wisdom partially fuelled
the ALL revision, and will no doubt continue to colour criticism of the ALL
in the future. From a comparative perspective, however, this conventional
view is puzzling and indeed seems confused. Both types of restrictions de-
scribed above – on causes of action and on available remedies – are quite
common in modern liberal democracies that enjoy strong rule of law. Both
also have generally applicable institutional explanations. Because the con-
ventional wisdom has had a direct impact in the design of China’s public
remedial system, identifying its errors is crucial for appreciating how radical
some aspects of the ALL are. For example, the process, described in the next
section, by which courts are now expected to offer “judicial recommenda-
tions” for the repeal, amendment, or suspension of IPDs is, to our knowledge,
internationally unique. 
Limitations on remedies provided by civil law courts
The logic of the two restrictions on the scope of judicial review is best ex-
plained in reverse order. First, there is an obvious explanation why Chinese
courts may not be permitted to “strike down” problematic agency rules.
This has to do with the idea that civil law judiciaries, on which the Chinese
judiciary is modelled, are generally expected to apply the law, not to make
law. Relatedly, decisions by civil law courts generally do not have preceden-
tial value, because they do not create norms of general application. While
some modern courts in civil law countries present exceptions to these gen-
eral rules, the rules continue to characterise the power of most civil law
courts. Precluding formal regulations from reinforcement clearly raises sus-
picions of both law-making (i.e., revoking binding law) and claiming to set
precedents, while precluding IPDs from enforcement also sets precedents.
This basic logic is supported by the fact that, in civil law countries, the ability
of courts to invalidate agency rules seems to be the exception, not the rule. 
In Germany, for example, an administrative court, when assessing the law-
fulness of an agency action, can review a regulation on which such act is
based and may rule that it is inconsistent with higher law and therefore
void. However, this is not a matter of “striking down” a regulation: it is an
assessment of its validity as a preliminary question; such preliminary find-
ings generally do not have any binding effect – not even between the parties
to the lawsuit. Similarly, German courts generally do not review informal
policy announcements but directly apply the law when assessing the law-
fulness of government actions. Any assessment of the lawfulness of an in-
formal rule constitutes a preliminary matter and therefore does not have
any binding effect (Panzer 2017: 8; Schmitz 2018: 212-3; Lindner 2018: 30-
2; Scherzberg and Seidl 2014).
This logic also represents the rationale for the set of extraordinary reme-
dies that the 2018 SPC Interpretation delineates for the finding of illegal
IPDs: judicial recommendations to the executive branch backed by the
threat of retrying cases where problematic IPDs are involved. The unusual
character of these remedies (discussed in the next section “Innovations in
the 2018 SPC interpretation”) arguably results from an effort to enable civil
law courts to do what they generally cannot do.
Of course, it is well known among comparative legal scholars that the ab-
sence of stare decisis in civil law systems does not necessarily prevent a
court decision from having wider impact. In practice, some degree of de
facto precedential value may be observed, particularly in decisions of a court
of last instance. Judgements can also be endowed with practically binding
effect within the executive branch through general administrative instruc-
tions. Nothing precludes court decisions from having this kind of effect in
China – indeed, increased transparency in adjudication can be expected to
strengthen it.
Limitations on pre-enforcement review 
If a court cannot strike down formal or informal agency rules, it should
also not hear disputes the main purpose of which is to challenge the validity
of such rules – the reviewing court would not be able to provide any rem-
edy. This simple logic already goes a long way toward justifying the non-
justiciability of “abstract administrative actions.” Using US terminology, we
will label the judicial review of an agency rule before its enforcement “pre-
enforcement review.” From a comparative perspective, pre-enforcement re-
view indeed requires extensions of the traditional powers of a civil law court.
Again, we offer Germany as an example. The German Code of Administra-
tive Court Procedure (VwGO) is widely known for a set of special provisions
in Section 47 whereby most state regulations and municipal by-laws are
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subject to direct judicial review for up to a year after their enactment. An
individual can bring a lawsuit challenging such regulations if s/he can
demonstrate that the regulation and its enforcement potentially infringes
upon her individual rights. If a higher administrative court finds a regulation
to be void, by law, the ruling has effect erga omnes, i.e., not only vis-à-vis
the parties to the lawsuit (Giesberts 2018: 65). This establishes an equivalent
to precedential value. However, this is precisely understood to be a singular
feature of Section 47 direct review, compared to the effect of other court
decisions under German law. In contrast, federal regulations cannot be
struck down by administrative courts with general effect. Finally, in general,
informal policy announcements themselves cannot be subject to judicial
pre-enforcement review due to their lack of legal effect. Only the acts based
on such announcements will be reviewed by administrational and consti-
tutional courts. 
These aspects of German administrative law illustrate the alien nature of
pre-enforcement review to civil law courts. However, it is important to em-
phasise that limitations on pre-enforcement review arise not only in civil
law countries. Such review can be rare even in common law jurisdictions.
In the United States, pre-enforcement review of federal agency actions is
strongly tied to the “notice and comment” procedural requirement for rule-
making under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). But for the APA, tra-
ditional justiciability doctrines would impose substantial restrictions on
pre-enforcement review (Landes and Posner 1994). It is now recognised
among comparative administrative law scholars that the APA itself is a very
American institution, and notice and comment procedures are relatively
rare in parliamentary (as opposed to presidential) political systems (Jensen
and McGrath 2011; Stiglitz and Figueiredo 2017). In other words, as far as
we can tell, the practice of pre-enforcement review of agency regulations
is sustained critically by procedural requirements on rulemaking, and these
procedural requirements are themselves rare creatures. Consequently, even
in common law jurisdictions such as Canada, the UK, and Australia, pre-en-
forcement reviews are rare. 
Scope v. standard of review 
The prevalence of these constraints on the “scope of judicial review” in
liberal democracies has two implications. First, these constraints do not in
themselves render the ALL either exceptional or inadequate. Second, mod-
ifying these constraints could involve relatively unusual institutional design,
given the parameters of a civil law judiciary (and of a nominally parliamen-
tary system). The 2015 ALL and 2018 SPC Interpretation precisely advance
such unusual design. Before discussing this new development, however, it
is important to highlight another dimension of judicial review, namely the
standard of review that a court should apply in adjudication, especially
when the agency action in dispute is based on some interpretation of
statutes that the agency favours but which the plaintiff challenges. In many
liberal democracies, the standard of judicial review has attracted extensive
attention from administrative law practitioners and scholars. By contrast,
although the issue has also inevitably arisen in Chinese practice, it has re-
ceived very limited attention from commentators. Importantly, it is along
this neglected dimension that the 2015 ALL and the 2018 SPC Interpreta-
tion have dealt a setback to judicial review.
Note from the outset that the standard of review is an important ques-
tion, regardless of whether the reviewing court is of the civil or common
law variety. Regardless of whether a court “merely” determines whether to
apply a policy interpretation advocated by the government, or whether the
court has the power to invalidate such an interpretation, the court needs
to decide the standard to which the government’s position must be held. A
comparison of four regimes – in China, the US, Canada, and Germany – sug-
gests that the adoption of this standard depends not at all on constraints
on the scope of review. 
Under the pre-2015 status quo – mostly articulated through the 2004
Shanghai Meeting Minutes – the standard by which Chinese courts reviewed
the purported legal basis of agency actions depended on the nature of the
purported basis. If a formal regulation is the ground offered, then a court
must determine the regulation’s legality before giving it effect. If an IPD is
the purported ground, then a court must review its legality and reasonable-
ness/appropriateness before giving it effect. It logically follows that IPDs
receive more stringent review and less deference than regulations. However,
beyond this, no guidance was offered as to the standards applicable when
conducting a review on either legality or reasonableness/appropriateness.
Interestingly, this approach bears resemblances to the US federal doctrine
on judicial review. US courts’ standard of review of agency statutory inter-
pretation also depends on the ways in which an agency’s position is devel-
oped. When formal regulations (i.e., mostly rules that have gone through
the notice and comment procedure required by the APA) are at stake, courts
apply the “Chevron test,” which in many instances leads to a high level of
deference (Merrill and Hickman 2001). By contrast, if only an informal policy
position serves as the ground of agency action, courts apply the less defer-
ential “Skidmore standard” (Hickman and Krueger 2007). While under both
types of standards, courts have been observed to be more likely to defer to
agency actions than not, the varying standards of review (both between
the Chevron and Skidmore tests, and within the Chevron test itself) clearly
give courts greater interpretive authority in some circumstances than in
others. How to characterise these standards thus has been an obsession of
US legal scholars (Vermeule 2017; Stack 2018).
By contrast, neither Germany nor Canada distinguishes between formal
regulations and informal agency rules in setting standards of review. In Ger-
many, the crucial distinction is between the interpretation and determina-
tion of constituent elements of a statutory provision and the exercise of
discretion (Arai-Takahashi 2000: 73). With respect to the former, courts gen-
erally have full authority to determine the correct interpretation of the
law. (26) While court decisions may be influenced by previous administrative
interpretations of the law de facto, courts tend not to defer to administra-
tive decisions openly. 
Canada, despite having a common law judiciary, takes an approach to
statutory interpretation that arguably bears greater affinity to Germany
than to the US. Historically, courts frequently applied the “correctness” stan-
dard of review to all questions of statutory interpretation, which required
little of courts by way of deference. In the seminal Dunsmuir decision in
2008, (27) the Supreme Court of Canada indicated that the “correctness stan-
dard” should be largely limited to areas where courts have distinctive com-
petence, whereas a reasonableness standard should be applied to the
remaining areas. Moreover, there ought to be a presumption of the reason-
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ableness of agency interpretation, which implies a more deferential view.
However, a heavy dose of “contextualism” has led Canadian courts to fash-
ion different subcategories of the reasonableness standard, leading to con-
cerns that many courts engage in a “disguised” correctness review.  
Putting aside the richness and high complexity of these administrative
law doctrines from different countries, our basic point is that the standard
of review is widely regarded in Western democracies as a crucial factor de-
termining the outcomes of judicial review, and that this standard can vary
in ways that are independent of whether the judiciary is of a civil or com-
mon law character. Just as the Canadian standards of review seem more
stringent than the American ones, the German standards of review seem
more stringent than the Chinese ones. Nonetheless, it is possible to read
into the pre-2015 practice in China a template that resembles the American
standards, where courts are entitled to substantial non-deference at least
with respect to IPDs. The 2018 SPC Interpretation, however, has fundamen-
tally altered this state of affairs: courts’ standard of review of informal
agency rules no longer includes reasonableness, and therefore is much
weaker and requires courts to display greater deference. 
Innovations in the 2018 SPC interpretation
The 2015 ALL for the first time provides plaintiffs with a right to request
that the court review an IPD that the plaintiff deems to be “not in accordance
with the law” (bu hefa 不合法), concurrently with reviewing the agency ac-
tion that serves as the original cause of action and to which the IPD purports
to provide legal basis. (28) Such right to review does not extend to formal reg-
ulations. (29) Since courts are still generally required to consider the legality
of any relevant formal regulation, the “review” of an IPD must therefore pos-
sess a special meaning. Accordingly, a newly added Article 64 of the 2015
ALL provides that if a court deems any IPD to be “not in accordance with
the law,” then not only should the court not rely on it to determine the le-
gality of the disputed agency action – this was already the case under the
pre-2015 law – but the court should also provide the promulgating authority
with “disposition recommendations.” In other words, the making of “dispo-
sition recommendations” (chuli jianyi 处理建议) to the executive branch has
become a remedy that a plaintiff may request as a matter of right.
The meaning of this new procedure received important elaboration in the
2018 SPC Interpretation, which contained a separate chapter on the concur-
rent review of IPDs. First, if a court discovers upon the review of an IPD that
it is possibly illegal, it should seek the opinions of the promulgating agency,
and give permission to that agency to state its opinion in court. (30) Second,
courts are instructed to review the legality of IPDs, and do so with regard to
not only the provisions on the basis of which the disputed agency action was
taken but also to “related provisions.” Specifically, any IPD is “illegal,” if it: 
[E]xceeds the statutory remit of the promulgating authority, or the
scope of delegation provided by statutes and regulations;
contravenes the provisions of any superior law;  
illegally increases any obligation, or derogates from any lawful rights
and interests, of any private party without appropriate basis in any
formal law;
fails to comply with any approval procedures or public issuance pro-
cedures stipulated by law, or seriously violates promulgation proce-
dures; or
otherwise violates the provisions of statutes of or regulations. (31)
This set of factors represents the first time that the SPC has provided ex-
plicit guidance on legality review of IPDs. (32) In particular, the reference in
clause (4) to procedures of approval, issuance, and promulgation in general
suggests, for the first time, that violating adoption procedures may itself be
sufficient grounds for deeming IPDs invalid. However, what types of proce-
dural requirements can be taken into account in the application of clause
(4) remains to be seen. (33)
Third, consistently with pre-2015 practice, the 2018 SPC Interpretation
instructs that illegal IPDs should not be used as the basis for a decision
on the challenged agency action. It also instructs that the judgment
should make explicit statements about such illegality. (34) Contrary to pre-
2015 practice, however – and especially overriding the relevant provi-
sions in the 2004 Shanghai Meeting Minutes –  the 2018 SPC
Interpretation instructs that once an IPD passes the legality test, it should
be given legal effect. There is no longer any mention of a “reasonable and
appropriate” review. In other words, lawful IPDs are now binding on
courts. The standard of review for IPDs is lowered both relative to previ-
ous practice, and to comparable US practice (e.g. the Skidmore standard).
For advocates of strong judicial review, this can only be viewed as a step
backward. 
Instead of elaborating the standard of review and strengthening judicial
review along this dimension, the 2018 SPC Interpretation offers an un-
precedented set of non-judicial remedies, where a reviewing court may
initiate a post-adjudication process of communication with the executive
branch, sometimes even obliging the latter to take action. Specifically, in
the case of an IPD found to be illegal, a court, after entering a decision
on the particular dispute, shall issue “disposition recommendations” to
the agency promulgating the IPD. It may also copy “the People’s govern-
ment at the same level as the agency, any agency at the next higher level,
the supervisory authority, and any recordation authority of the IPD” on
the recommendation. (35) Moreover – going beyond what is contemplated
in Article 64 of the 2015 ALL – a court may, within three months from
the date when the decision takes effect, provide the promulgating author-
ity with “judicial proposals” (sifa jianyi 司法建议) for an amendment or
repeal of the IPD. If a court decided to submit such a judicial proposal, an
agency receiving the proposal “shall” (yingdang 应当) make a written reply
within 60 days from the date of receipt of the proposal. In the case of
emergency, a court may even propose that the promulgating authority,
or the agency at the next higher level, immediately suspend the enforce-
ment of the IPD.
The power of the judiciary to propose the amendment or revocation of
IPDs (albeit only ones that are not in accordance with law) seems extraor-
dinary. It is indeed unclear what basis a court has for imposing an obligation
on the executive branch to respond. As if to strengthen its power to do so,
the 2018 SPC Interpretation provides that if a court deems an IPD to be
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legally invalid, it is required to file the decision (post adjudication) with the
court at the next higher level for the record. (36) Moreover, if an IPD promul-
gated by a department of the State Council or a provincial agency is in-
volved, any judicial proposal made to the executive branch should also be
submitted to provincial high courts and the SPC for record. (37) This seems
to ensure that the finding of an illegal IPD will be escalated within the ju-
diciary, and that first-instance courts are not left to their own devices to
pursue the (rather entrepreneurial) undertaking of issuing recommendations
to the executive branch. 
The filing of decisions and proposals with higher courts also potentially
facilitates a final set of remedies. The 2018 SPC Interpretation provides
that “where the president of a court at any level discovers that any ef-
fective judgment or ruling of the court erroneously determined the le-
gality of an IPD, and deems that a retrial is necessary, he/she would make
a referral to the adjudication committee of the court for discussion.” (38)
Moreover, “if the SPC or any superior court discovers that an effective
judgment or ruling of a lower court erroneously determined the legality
of an IPD, it (the SPC or superior court) has the authority to conduct a
retrial or to appoint a subordinate court to do so.” (39) The ability of the
judiciary to re-open cases that implicate controversial executive branch
policy seems to provide an important incentive for agencies to respond
to recommendations from the judiciary. Table 1 summarises these ex-
traordinary measures.
Conclusion
Overall, recent developments seem to have considerably strengthened the
institutions for carrying out judicial review of government actions in China,
in at least two respects. First, this has been a period of dynamic doctrinal
elaboration, of which the 2018 SPC Interpretation can be seen as a capstone,
but in relation to which the unprecedented disclosure of court decisions is
perhaps even more significant (Liebman et al. 2017). Second, judicial review
is increasingly conducted by higher courts – including important new (supra-
provincial) circuit courts and (provincial) cross-district courts. Even aside
from the allocation of new institutional resources, an 87% increase in first-
instance cases and 200% increase in appeals, accompanied by little court
backlog and a sizeable increase in the percentage of adjudicated cases, pro-
vide prima facie evidence for greater efficiency in court operations.
However, for several reasons, one must be cautious in drawing conclu-
sions from these descriptions. First, much scholarly discussion in China
about judicial review has engaged with proposals to revise the ALL, yet the
ALL’s revision is, as we tried to show, clearly a matter of top-down institu-
tional design, driven visibly by a small group of actors in the SPC and
NPCSC. The question can be raised as to whether this sociological origin
of the discourse on ALL has affected its content. For example, radical pro-
posals that lack clear functional justification but that accentuate the sym-
bolism of judicial review – such as creating a separate administrative court
system, requiring agency chiefs to appear in court, and emboldening judges
to constrain executive branch rulemaking – seem to attract perennial in-
terest. At the same time, basic facts about how the thousands of court ad-
ministrative divisions across China have handled cases tend to remain
obscure – with the SPC acting as one of the few sources of information.
Indeed, even the well-known “three difficulties” of bringing suits against
agency defendants are not well-documented empirically: empirical ac-
counts of what proportion of lawsuits had been declined by courts at the
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Pre-2015 2015 and after
Illegal regulations or IPDs as cause of 
action
No No
Illegal regulations and IPDs not to be
applied
Yes Yes: new instructions on IPD legality review 
Unreasonable or inappropriate IPDs not
to be applied
Yes No: court must give effect to legal IPDs
Post-adjudication procedures for
recommendations to executive branch
No
Yes: 
• Mandatory disposition recommendations
• Optional judicial recommendations to amend or repeal 
• (to which promulgating agencies must respond)
• Optional recommendations for suspension of enforcement
Post-adjudication procedures for filing
with higher courts
No Yes: Mandatory recording of illegal IPDs 
Right of higher courts to retry cases
based on illegal IPDs
No Yes
Table 1 – Remedies for the review of formal and informal agency rules
outset, for example, vary widely in their estimates. Therefore, it is important
– especially for Western commentators – to recognise the existence of
these gaps and not to conflate a stylised discourse on administrative liti-
gation with its reality.
Second, Chinese scholars and policymakers have yet to articulate a nor-
mative framework for conceptualising what forms enhanced judicial power
should take. Should it, for example, be courts’ frequent use of various sanc-
tions of agency misconduct in the course of litigation, of the power to make
judicial recommendations for amending or repealing illegal IPDs, or of the
authority to retry cases? Or should it, again for example, be the ability of
individual judges to introduce policy considerations into adjudication
through reviewing the reasonableness of IPDs (which the Shanghai Meeting
Minutes contemplated but which the 2018 SPC Interpretation seems to
abolish)? An important and common theme in contemporary administrative
law scholarship in liberal democracies is how to preserve the integrity of
judicial review while recognising the limitations of the judiciary within the
modern state in the interpretation and enforcement of policy (Merrill and
Hickman 2001; Hickman and Krueger 2007; Vermeule 2017; Stack 2018;
Arai-Takahashi 2000; Schmitz 2018; Oster 2008; Decker 2018; Daly 2018).
Arguably, this theme has largely been absent from Chinese discourse in re-
forming the ALL.  
Third and finally, many commentators on Chinese administrative liti-
gation may intuitively associate increasing judicial strength with polit-
ical liberalisation (Cui 2017: 992-6): judicial independence is interesting
because it increases the chances of political liberalisation. However, a
different perspective is that an adequately functioning judiciary only
represents an aspect of state capacity, and even authoritarian regimes
can display strong state capacity (Albertus and Menaldo 2017). From
this latter perspective, even an unquestioned strengthening of judicial
review in China may bear little implication for Chinese politics. Exploring
this perspective is beyond the scope of this paper: after all, the tendency
to conflate judicial review with particular normative visions is not
unique to China. (40) But the possibility of such a perspective is an im-
portant reason not to presuppose that judicial review must have political
significance.
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40. For instance, Vermeule laments much “wasted energy” directed against the Chevron doctrine in
the US (which delineates permissible judicial deference to the executive branch), motivated
(among other things) by “a fervent, if cockeyed, constitutional vision [or by] free-market libertar-
ianism” (Vermeule 2017).
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